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ABSTRACT:  This paper discusses the implementation of monetary policy 
in New Zealand and its flow-on effects on the 90-day bank bill rate over the 
1999-2005 period. The effects of external factors are considered as well. Our 
findings indicate that the maturity spectrum ratio exerted a positive effect on 
the 90-day rate while the allotment ratio did not. This interest rate had a 
tendency to revert to the level set by its Australian counterpart. No such link 
exists between the NZ 90-day rate and the US 90-day rate. Neither the 
maturity spectrum nor the allotment ratio contributed to the volatility of the 
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  21. Introduction 
  At present the majority of central banks in the industrialized world implement 
monetary policy by setting a short-term nominal interest rate. The interest rate in 
question is often an overnight rate. To steer the overnight rate, a central bank typically 
relies on both standing facilities and open-market operations. Standing facilities can 
be thought of as an automatic conduit through which liquidity enters or leaves the 
financial sector of the economy. Trading banks that need additional cash balances to 
cover their position can access the standing facility at a rate slightly higher than the 
overnight rate. Alternatively, trading banks that have surplus cash balances can park 
them overnight at a rate slightly below the prevailing interest rate. Standing facilities 
are not a new concept per se. They were widely used during the days of the operation 
of the gold standard. However, in those days the standing facilities were one-sided in 
the sense that the central bank would only provide liquid funds to trading banks in 
exchange for discountable securities.
1 There were no arrangements whereby trading 
banks could deposit surplus reserves. In this set-up the discount rate played a key role 
in the implementation of monetary policy as it served as the benchmark for short-term 
interest rates in the financial market. 
  Through discretionary open-market operations the central bank manages the 
liquidity of the financial sector of the economy. A central bank structures its open-
market operations in such a way so as to keep the policy instrument at the target level. 
Open-market operations are central to the implementation of monetary policy in the 
Euro area, the United States, Australia and New Zealand and many other countries. 
However, the frequency of use (daily versus weekly operations), types of transactions 
(outright purchases and sales of securities vs repurchase agreements, fixed versus 
variable rate tenders) and purpose (signal of change in monetary policy) differ 
markedly amongst central banks. For instance, the Federal Reserve follows no fixed 
schedule in its operations and has a habit of purchasing securities outright from 
dealers. In contrast, the European Central Bank prefers to engage mainly in regular 
weekly reverse repurchase agreements to provide additional liquidity directly to the 
banking sector. Interestingly, the European Central Bank switched from fixed to 
                                                 
1 Indeed to this day, the standing facility operated by the Federal Reserve System in the United States is 
one-sided. Trading banks can borrow reserves from the Fed but cannot deposit surplus funds and earn 
interest on them. Standing facilities were operated in a similar way by the German Bundesbank until 
1999. 
  3variable rate tender auctions in June 2000 to relieve the overbidding problem.
2 The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand does not use open-market operations to signal a 
change in monetary policy while such operations are central to implementing a 
change in monetary policy in the United States.  
  Until recently, daily open-market operations were the norm in New Zealand. 
The daily transactions provide the unique opportunity to study the day-to-day 
implementation of monetary policy in New Zealand. The central concern of this paper 
is to show how the daily conduct of monetary policy affected the behaviour of the 90-
day bank bill rate over the March 1999 – June 2005 period. Our empirical study aims 
to verify to what extent the structure of open-market operations affected the mean and 
the volatility of this market-determined interest rate over the sample period in a small, 
relatively open economy.
3  Essentially, our aim is to determine whether the methods 
used by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to provide adequate liquidity to the 
financial sector of the New Zealand economy had any bearing on the behaviour of the 
90-day bank bill rate. We also examine whether short-term interest rates in foreign 
capital markets had any measurable impact on the 90-day bank bill rate in New 
Zealand. Towards this end, we study the behaviour of comparable short-term interest 
rates in Australia, an important regional financial market, and the United States, the 
world’s largest financial market. The point of departure of our analysis is, however, a 
close examination of changes in the stance of monetary policy in New Zealand, 
Australia, and the United States over the sample period. The reason for scrutinizing 
the timing of changes in monetary policy is to establish whether there is a systematic 
                                                 
2 For a study of the overbidding problem encountered by the European Central Bank, see Nautz and 
Oechssler (2003). Ayuso and Repullo (2003) argue that the extreme overbidding phenomenon 
associated with fixed rate tenders is consistent with an asymmetric loss function that punishes low 
interbank rates more severely than high interbank rates.  
3 A few recent empirical studies examine the behavior of interest rates in the larger economies of 
Europe and North America. Bartolini and Prati (2006) show that differences in the way central banks 
operate their standing facilities can account for the observed cross-country differences in the volatility 
of overnight interest rates. Looking at the German experience before and after the establishment of the 
EMU, Perez Quiros and Mendizabal (2006) find that a central bank that retains the right to impose 
reserve requirements over a maintenance period and offers borrowing and lending facilities exercises 
tight control over the overnight interest rate. Their model offers an explanation for why the overnight 
interest rate does not follow a martingale process. Nautz and Offermanns (2006) study the dynamic 
behavior of the European overnight interest rate and its response to policy and term spreads. A study 
similar in approach to ours is by Kugler and Jordan (2004). They examine the effect of allotment and 
maturity spectrum ratios on the 30, 60, and 90-day LIBOR in the daily implementation of monetary 
policy in Switzerland. 
 
  4leader-follower pattern in the conduct of monetary policy that is also evident in the 
market-determined short term interest rates. 
  Our most important results can be summarized briefly here. Regarding the 
hypothesised link between the structure of open-market operations and behaviour of 
the 90-day bank bill rate in New Zealand, we find that the maturity structure of open-
market operations affected the mean but not the variance of the 90-day bank bill rate. 
The allotment ratio, the extent to which the Reserve Bank accommodated the 
financial sector’s bids for cash balances, had no flow-on effects or repercussions for 
the most important short-term interest rate. The level of the 90-day bank bill rate in 
New Zealand also appeared to adjust to the level of the 90-day bank bill rate in 
Australia, albeit at a slow speed. There is no evidence that 90-day rates in New 
Zealand responded to 90-day rates in the United States over the whole sample period. 
More generally, our findings suggest that short-term interest rates in Oceania moved 
independently of those in the United States for much of the sample period. This 
conclusion emerges after reviewing the timing of changes in the policy instrument in 
the three countries. 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a brief 
analysis of monetary policy changes in New Zealand, Australia, and the United 
States. Section 3 provides an overview of the implementation of monetary policy in 
New Zealand. Section 4 presents the empirical findings of our study of the effects of 
open-market operations and foreign interest rate linkages on the behaviour of the 90-
day bank bill rate in New Zealand. Section 5 offers a brief summary and conclusion. 
 
2. A Short Descriptive Analysis of Monetary Policy Changes in New Zealand, 
Australia, and the United States 
 
  Our primary focus in this section is on the monetary policy changes that 
occurred in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States over the period from 
March 17
th, 1999 to June 30
th, 2005. The beginning of the sample period coincides 
with the switch by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand from targeting cash settlement 
balances to setting the official cash rate. Figure 1 shows the setting of the official 
policy instrument in each country over the sample period. Table 1 lists the dates of the 
policy changes, the announced new level of the policy instrument, the size of the 
change in the instrument as well as additional information that characterizes the 
conduct of monetary policy in the three countries. The ancillary information consists 
  5of the day of the week the policy change was announced, the duration of the 
announced policy change in trading and calendar days, respectively, and the flow-on 
effect on short-term market interest rates. The last two columns give an indication of 
the same-day effect of the change in the official cash rate in New Zealand, the 
overnight cash rate in Australia and the federal funds rate in the United States on key 
short-term market interest rates. In New Zealand and Australia the 90-day bank bill 
rate is arguably the most important short-term market interest rate. For the United 
States, we chose the 90-day commercial paper rate. The three interest rates represent 
the yields on short-term debt instruments issued by banks and corporate entities to 
secure financial capital.  
  The information arrayed in Table 2 proves helpful in interpreting the statistics 
contained in Table 1 and the constellation of interest rates in Figure 1. Over the 
sample period the stance of monetary policy was changed most often in the United 
States. The Federal Open Market Committee saw fit to change the target for the 
federal funds rate on 28 occasions. There were 24 changes in the official cash rate in 
New Zealand. Australia had the fewest policy changes with 16. The Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand increased the official cash rate 16 times and lowered it eight times. The 
Reserve Bank of Australia tightened the stance of monetary policy ten times and 
eased on six occasions. The Federal Open Market Committee raised the federal funds 
rate target 15 times and lowered it 13 times. Most of the policy changes in the three 
countries occurred in steps of 25 basis points. Closer scrutiny of the policy changes in 
the United States reveals that the Federal Open Market Committee eased the stance of 
monetary policy more aggressively in steps of 50 basis points rather than 25 basis 
points (9 as opposed to 4) but preferred to tighten the stance of policy in steps of 25 
basis points rather than 50 basis points (14 as opposed to 1). No such pattern is 
evident in the behaviour of either the Reserve Bank of New Zealand or the Reserve 
Bank of Australia. Both central banks showed far less willingness to ease the stance 
of monetary policy in steps of 50 basis points, relying instead more often on 25 basis 
point decreases. Notice though that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand raised the 
official cash rate by 50 basis points on three occasions while the Australian central 
bank did so only once.  
  Turning our attention to the coordination of policy moves between New 
Zealand on the one hand and Australia and the United States on the other, we find that 
monetary policy changes in New Zealand were closely aligned with monetary policy 
  6changes in the United States from November 1999 to mid-November 2001. Of the ten 
policy changes that occurred in New Zealand during this period, all of them were in 
the same direction as interest changes in the US; five policy changes in New Zealand 
occurred within 24 hours of the announcement of policy changes in the United 
States.
4 The Reserve Bank of Australia also followed the US lead in changing interest 
rates over the November 1999 to December 2001 period. A series of interest hikes 
had raised the overnight cash rate from 5 to 6.25 percent by August 2000, only to be 
followed by a series of decreases. The synchronous policy moves underscore the fact 
that in the early part of the sample period, the economies of New Zealand, Australia, 
and the United States were in the same phase of the business cycle.  
  The leader-follower pattern evident in the behaviour of the three central banks 
disappears at the end of 2001 in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States. 
For the remainder of the sample period there is also not much evidence for a close 
coordination of monetary policies between the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the 
Reserve Bank of Australia. It is true that in May and June 2002 the Australian central 
bank tightened the stance of monetary policy and that the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand followed suit. But the cycle of monetary policy tightenings had begun in New 
Zealand as early as March 20
th, 2002, thus preceding the move by the Australian 
central bank by approximately 50 days. The seeming coordinated policy move in 
March 2005 between the two central banks came on the heels of a series of 
tightenings in New Zealand in 2004.  
  It is instructive to examine the range of settings of the policy instrument in the 
three countries. According to Table 2, the overnight cash rate in Australia had the 
narrowest range, varying from a low of 4.25 percent to a high of 6.25 percent. The 
range of the official cash rate was slightly wider in New Zealand where the lowest 
and highest settings coincide with the instrument settings observed at the beginning 
and end of the sample period. The United States experienced the widest swings in the 
policy instrument due to the continued decreases in the federal funds rage target 
which began in January 2001 and ended in June 2004 when the federal funds rate 
target was raised from 1 to 1.25 percent. Notice that in the United States the target for 
                                                 
4 Because of the 18 hour time difference between New Zealand and the Eastern Time Zone of the 
United States, the move to adjust interest rates in New Zealand on September 19
th, 2001 in the wake of 
the easing of monetary policy in the US on September 17
th falls roughly into the 24 hour window.  The 
dates of the closely coordinated policy changes were: Nov. 17
th, 1999, May 15
th, 2000, April 19
th, 
2001, and May 16
th, 2001. 
  7the federal funds rate at the beginning of the sample period (4.75 percent) exceeded 
the target at the end of the sample period (3.25 percent). Just the opposite holds for 
the target for the overnight cash rate in Australia and the official cash rate in New 
Zealand. In both countries, the respective target rate at the end of the sample period 
exceeded the target at the beginning, with the difference amounting to 2.25 percent in 
New Zealand but only 0.75 percent in Australia. Comparing the average length of 
duration, we find that the average duration in calendar days of a given policy stance 
was about 3 months for New Zealand and the United States. For Australia the average 
length was considerably higher. There the policy setting was left unchanged on 
average for almost 5 months. 
  The last two columns of Table 1 capture the effect of changes in the policy 
instrument on the 90-day bank bill or commercial paper rate.
5 Inspection of these 
columns reveals that the same day response of market interest rates to changes in the 
policy setting varied considerably in the three countries. In New Zealand, an 
announced change in the official cash rate was accompanied by a change in the 90-
day bank bill rate of more than 10 basis points in the same direction on eight 
occasions.  In Australia, the response of the 90-day bank bill rate to changes in the 
target cash rate was much more muted, with only three changes in the 90-day rate 
exceeding 10 basis points and following the direction of the change in the policy 
instrument.  The commercial paper rate in the US reacted least sensitively to changes 
in the policy target. Of 28 changes in the federal funds rate target, only four 
announced decreases in the policy instrument led to more than 10 basis point 
decreases in the 90-day commercial paper rate.






                                                 
5 Monetary policy changes are announced in the morning, usually around the time when financial 
markets open for the day.  
6 Kuttner (2001) calculates the surprise element of a monetary policy action by examining observed 
changes in the federal funds rate futures on the day of the policy announcement. Futures contracts for 
the overnight cash rate (interbank borrowing rate), the equivalent interest rate in New Zealand, do not 
exist.   
7 An earlier version of this paper also looked at the extent to which market interest rates anticipated and 
responded to actual policy changes in the three countries over the sample period. An examination of the 
co-movements between changes in the setting of policy instrument and 12 leads as well as 12 lags of 
changes in the market interest rate reveals that the 90-day bank bill rate in New Zealand moved much 
more ahead of actual policy changes than its counterpart in Australia and the United States. 
  83. The Implementation of Monetary Policy in New Zealand  
 
  Since March 17
th, 1999 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has been relying on 
an operating procedure that has the official cash rate as its fulcrum.
8 The Reserve 
Bank sets the official cash rate. The level at which the official cash rate is set is 
reviewed eight times per year at pre-announced dates. The operating procedure rests 
on two pillars. The first pillar is the provision of a standing facility whereby the 
Reserve Bank stands ready to accept surplus cash settlement balances from and lend 
additional cash settlement balances to registered financial institutions overnight at 
interest rates that lie 25 basis points below and 25 basis points above the official cash 
rate, respectively.
9 The second pillar is the daily interaction with the financial market 
through open-market operations. The intended aim of this operating procedure is 
twofold: first, to ensure that the overnight market interest rate at which banks borrow 
from and lend to each other remains within this corridor of  25 ±  basis points around 
the official cash rate. Second, the official cash rate serves as a benchmark for short-
term interest rates in the domestic financial market. A further characteristic of the 
current regime is that the Reserve Bank has set an objective of NZ$ 20 million for the 
volume of “free” cash settlement balances at the end of each trading day.
10,11  
                                                 
8 This section describes the original operating procedure that was in place over the sample period  
(March 17
th 1999- June 30
th 2005). Since then a few changes have been introduced to improve the 
provision and allocation of liquidity in the financial sector. See footnote 11 for further details. The 
operation of the cash rate system in New Zealand has been described by Archer et al (1999) and 
Brookes and Hampton (2000). Frazer (2004) gives an overview of the liquidity management operations 
of RBNZ. Nield (2006) describes the rationale for changing the operational framework in June 2006.  
9 Apart from the overnight borrowing facility, there also exists an autorepo facility by means of which 
banks can secure intraday liquidity at no cost. However, extending this source of borrowing to 
overnight borrowing incurs a penalty rate of 5 additional basis points which puts the total cost of 
borrowing at 30 (25+5) basis points above the official cash rate. 
10 Under unusual circumstances this quantity target was altered. For instance, after the end of the 
sample period on February 2nd, 2006, the target was raised temporarily to NZ$ 500 million. Shortly 
thereafter it was raised even higher to NZ$ 2 billion. At the time the Reserve Bank cited the shortage of 
government stock, which serves as collateral in open-market operations and other financial 
transactions, as being behind the temporary increase in the volume of cash balances.  Leaving more 
cash balances in the system simply obviated the need for securing liquidity through the standing 
facilities of the Reserve Bank. This move had no implications for the conduct of monetary policy but 
laid bare the inefficiency of the existing framework.  
11 In June 2006, the Reserve Bank proposed to change the operation of the official cash rate regime 
somewhat. The changes to the modus operandi had two basic objectives: first, to improve the provision 
of liquidity to the financial sector by de-emphasizing the use of open-market operations in the daily 
implementation of monetary policy; second, to generate a more vibrant market for inter-bank 
borrowing. Among the proposed innovations were the abolition of the autorepo facility, a substantial 
increase in the target for cash balances supplied by the Reserve Bank, the remuneration of cash 
balances on deposit with the Reserve Bank at the official cash rate (OCR), and an increase in the cost 
of borrowing cash balances from the Reserve Bank from OCR + 25 basis points to OCR + 50 basis 
points. Under the new arrangement, the official cash rate forms the floor of a 50 basis-points corridor.  
  9  The purpose of open-market operations is to smooth the liquidity flows in and 
out of the financial sector.
12 If the expected liquidity position of trading banks is 
covered by the successful implementation of open-market operations, then trading 
banks should be no more likely to have to seek additional funds from the standing 
facility than to have surplus cash balances at the end of the day. This implies that the 
official cash rate is at the centre of a symmetric corridor. Algebraically, the official 
cash rate is a weighted average of the two interest rates that define the corridor where 
either interest rate is weighted by the respective probability of lacking or excess 
liquidity in the financial sector. 
bd s dd s
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=
      ( 1 )    
 
where   official cash rate  t i =
  interest rate at which trading banks borrow funds from the Reserve Bank 
b
t i =
  interest rate at which trading banks deposit surplus funds at the Reserve 
  Bank 
d
t i =
  probability that banks’ liquidity needs exceed liquidity  
  supply. 
ds
tt P( L L 0 ) −>=
  probability that liquidity supply exceeds banks’ liquidity  
  needs. 
sd
tt P( L L 0 ) −>
As the intended aim of open-market operations is to make the two probabilities equal, 
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In New Zealand the width of the corridor is 50 basis points.
13  
 
Hence           ( 3 )  
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Since July 2006, open-market operations have not been conducted on a regular daily basis. Foreign 
exchange swaps have become the preferred instrument of the Reserve Bank to affect liquidity 
conditions in the financial market. 
12 This explanation draws on Bindseil and Wuertz (2005). Their paper provides an overview of issues 
in the implementation of monetary policy. The operation of the interest rate corridor has also been aptly 
described by Woodford (2001). 
13 Interest rates are expressed as percentage points, i.e. 5 percent.  
  10Substituting
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 (3) into (2) yields  
b
tt i i 0.25 =−           ( 4 )  
The rate at which trading banks borrow from the standing facility at the Reserve Ba
exceeds the cash rate by 25 
d
t i
points below the cash rate. 
  The provision of adequate liquidity to the financial sector of the economy is 
central to the successful implementation of the current cash rate system. To ensure 
that sufficient cash settlement balances are maintained in the settlement accounts
the major financial institutions of the country, the Reserve Bank conducts open-
market operations.  These operations are conducted daily at 9:30 am by means of 
variable rate tenders.
14 All registered participants have 15 minutes to submit their 
bids. To meet its objective for cash settlement balances at the end of each trad
the Reserve Bank needs to have precise information about the government’s 
transactions with the public. The expected daily flows of funds from and into the 
government’s coffers occur through the trading banks and hence affect their liquidity
position. The Reserve Bank aims to anticipate these flows by coordinating its open-
market operations with the help of advice from the New Zealand Debt Managem
Office (NZDMO). This advice comes in the form of detailed information about 
expected disbursements of government funds to the public such as the payment o
pensions, payment of salaries, the maturity of long-term government debt or the 
collection of tax revenue and customs duties. Once the Reserve Bank has up-to-date 
information about the expected inflows and outflows of cash from the financial sector, 
it is in a position to structure its open-market operations to meet the liquidity need
the financial sector. More specifically, the Reserve Bank can then determine and 
announce to the registered participants the size and maturity dates of its open-mark
operations. If the Reserve Bank wishes to inject additional cash balances into the 
financial sector,  the Bank  offers to engage in a reverse repurchase agreement (repo).
If it desires to withdraw cash, it offers to engage in an ordinary repurchase 
agreement.
15 These transactions involve the immediate exchange of cash balances
securities or vice versa and fix the date on which the transaction is reversed. The 
 
14 With a few exceptions, open-market operations were conducted on every trading day over the March 
17
th 1999-June 30
th 2005 period.  
15 The Reserve Bank also occasionally invites bids for seasonal treasury bills with a maturity of 1 to 3 
months. 
  11Reserve Bank also announces the minimum (maximum) interest rate that it is willing













                                                
16 A noteworthy 
feature of the liquidity management operations conducted by the Reserve Bank is that 
it offers overnight reverse repos starting the week prior to an announced policy review
date. These overnight transactions complement the standard transactions that involve 
longer terms to maturity. The provision of overnight reverse repos allows the tradin
banks to opt out of transactions of repos that mature after the policy review date.   
  Figures 2 and 3 provide some feedback on the maturity spectrum of open
market operations conducted by the Reserve Bank over the period beginning o
March 17
th, 1999 and ending on June 30
th, 2005. Figure 2 shows the maturity 
spectrum of the transactions that the Reserve Bank offered to undertake. There are 
two noteworthy features about the transactions on offer. First, the data reveal a series
of spikes and a distinct saw-tooth pattern on three occasions. Second, barring a few 
exceptions, the term to maturity of transactions offered becomes shor
t half of 2004 and continues to the end of the sample period.  
Closer examination of the open-market operations reveals that with one 
exception all spikes are accounted for by transactions whereby the Reserve Bank 
offered to sell Treasury Bills to withdraw cash from the financial sector. The three 
distinct saw teeth are due to reverse repurchase agreements that were offered to off
the injection of cash brought about by maturing government debt on February 15
th 
2000, February 15
th, 2001, and March 15
th, 2002. Consider the first saw tooth. Its
shape was arguably influenced by the Y2K factor. Also from October 11
th, 1999 
onward, the Reserve Bank offered reverse repurchase agreements that matured on 
January 12
th and January 27
th, 2000 to soak up potential excess liquidity. On the sa
day in October, the Bank also began to offer reverse repurchase agreements with 
maturity date February 15
th, 2000 and repeated this offer on every trading day until 
February 15
th. The willingness by the Reserve Bank to inject cash daily over this 4-
month period is behind the saw tooth pattern. Figure 2, however, is just part of the 
story as it reflects only the maturity spectrum of transactions offered by the Reserve 
Bank. The maturity profile of actual transactions that occurred on each trading day 
between the Reserve Bank and the registered participants in open market operation
 
16 The Reserve Bank also informs the participants of the actual cash settlement balances that were left 
in the banking sector at the end of the preceding trading day and of its estimate for the flow of funds 
into and out of the financial sector on the trading day.  
  12appears in Figure 3. It is apparent that the distinct saw tooth pattern of Figure 2 is 
absent from Figure 3. Evidently, financial institutions did not take up the offer of 
reverse repurchase agreements that were made well in advance of the maturity date of 
government bonds but deferred accepting reverse repurchase agreements until shortly
before the government bonds matured. For instance, the first actual completion of
reverse repurchase agreement with maturity date February 15, 2000 occurred on 
December 1, 1999, approximately 50 days after it had been first offered on Octob
11
th, 1999. Notice that beginning midyear in 2004 the maturity profile of offered 
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 and ordinary repurchase agreements also declined somewhat.  
To complete the description of  how the Reserve Bank interacts with financ
institutions in the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy, we also have to 
examine the bids for reverse and ordinary repurchase agreements. Figure 4 depicts 
volume of bids submitted by registered participants in open-market operations. In 
addition, Figure 4 also shows the volume of transactions per maturity as offered by 
the Reserve Bank. In the overwhelming majority of the cases, the volume bid by the 
registered participants far exceeded the volume of offers announced by the Reserve 
Bank. Total volume offered by the Reserve Bank remained low and steady until mid-
September 2001 (“9/11”) after which the Reserve Bank increased its offers of rever
repurchase agreements markedly.
17 There are a few solid spikes, indicating that a
times the volume of cash offered by the Reserve Bank exceeded the volume bid. 
Towards the end of 2004 there is a marked decline in the size of offers per m
Indeed the volume of transactions offered at the end of the sample period is 
approximately the same as at the beginning. Also notice that the bidding behaviour b
the registered participants changed at the end of the sample period. Th
d markedly relative to the beginning of the sample period.
18   
Given the above information about open-market operations, we now propose
to construct two variables that are meant to capture important characteristics of the 
implementation of monetary policy in New Zealand. The first variable describes the 
 
17 Over the September 12, 2001 – April 1, 2005 period the Reserve Bank of NZ undertook only eight 
ordinary repurchase agreements and three transactions involving Treasury Bills. All other transactions 
carried out during this period were reverse repurchase agreements.  
18 This is consistent with the Reserve Bank’s view that a slight underbidding problem had developed at 
the very end of the sample period. Due to the shortage of government securities the existing mechanism 
through which liquidity was provided to the market had become inefficient. As a result, trading banks 
began to turn increasingly to the standing facilities provided by RBNZ. 
  13extent to which the Reserve Bank accommodated the bids submitted by the register
participants. We call this variable the allotment ratio (AR). This ratio is simply the 
total amount transacted in an open-market operation divided by the volume of bids 
submitted by the registered participants on a given day. The second variable indi
the importance of one-day reverse and ordinary repurchase agreements in open-
market operations. We call this variable the maturity spectrum ratio (MS). This ratio
is the volume of one-day reverse or ordinary repurchase agreements divided by
volume of all repurchase agreements. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the frequency 
distribution of the allotment ratio and the maturity spectrum ratio. Inspection of 
Figure 5 reveals that in 1999 and 2000 a number of open-market operations resu
in no transactions. Since 2001 zero allotment ratios have been much rarer. Full 
allotment occurred in nearly ten percent of all transactions. The mean allotment rat
over the sample period is 0.483 which suggests that on average the Reserve Bank 
accepted nearly 50 percent of the total volume of bids received. The allotment ratio 
remained fairly stable over the sample period. However, there is a noticeable surge
the allotment ratio at the end of the sample period. According to Figure 6, the M
ratio at the end of the sample period is very different from the MS ratio at the 
beginning of the sample period. The presence of sizeable gaps along the time axis 
suggests that virtually no open-market transactions involving one-day repos (ordin
and reverse) were carried out as the new operating system was being put in plac
However, there is a tight cluster of daily open-market operations that involved 
overnight repos near the end of the sample period. This suggests that one-day rep
became the preferred vehicle to change liquidity conditions in the New Zealand 
financial market only a few years after the change in the operating regime. Also note 
that in 2004 and the first part of 2005 the MS ratio is frequently unity which suggests 













the mean ratio of the volume of one-day repos to the volume of all repos was 
0.130. 
pen-Market Operations and the Existence of Foreign Interest Rate 
inkages. 
 
4. The Behaviour of the 90-Day Bank Bill Rate in New Zealand: Examining the 
ffects of O E
L
 
  The purpose of the current section is twofold. First, we examine whether the 
behaviour of the 90-day bank bill rate in New Zealand is influenced by the structure 
  14of open-market operations. More specifically, we seek to establish to what extent the 










ability to secure cash balances in open market operations on 
future trading days.  
                                                
day bank bill rate.  
  Our first hypothesis is that there ought to be an inverse relationship betwe
the allotment ratio and the 90-day bank bill rate. A decrease in this ratio signals 
rationed access to liquidity in the banking sector which in turn should lead to upward 
pressure on short-term interest rates such as the 90-day bank bill rate. If trading ban
do not succeed in covering their liquidity position through open-market operatio
and minimize or refrain altogether from accessing the more expensive standing 
facilities at the Reserve Bank, they have to enter the inter-bank market for settleme




  Second, an increase in the maturity spectrum ratio implies that the Rese
Bank becomes more cautious in allocating liquidity to the financial sector. An 
increase in the volume of overnight reverse repos to the total volume of reverse repos 
marks a shift in emphasis from providing liquidity on a longer-term basis to a shorter-
term basis. This effect, too, should spill over into the financial market, putting upw
pressure on the 90-day bank bill rate immediately as it signals greater uncertainty 
about trading banks’ 
 
19 Making use of the standing facility, i.e. borrowing from the Reserve Bank is generally more 
expensive than borrowing in the inter-bank market as the lending rate is 25 basis points above the 
official cash rate.  
20 It is important to be mindful of the fact that decreases in the allotment ratio can also come about 
because of a change in the bidding behaviour of trading banks in the period leading up to a review of 
the monetary policy stance. Specifically, if trading banks expect an easing of monetary policy, they 
withhold bids to procure additional settlement cash balances prior to the date of the policy review as 
such cash balances can be obtained at lower cost after the decrease in the official cash rate is 
announced. Over the sample period, there were two episodes in which the Reserve Bank lowered the 
official cash rate by 75 basis points in three consecutive steps of 25 basis points each. The first episode 




th. The second round of 25 basis-point decreases in the official cash rate took place on April 
24
th, June 5
th, and July 24
th, 2003. In each of the six cases, we picked the five days preceding the policy 
review date. For each day we calculated an allotment ratio that is based solely on bids and transactions 
with dates of maturity up to the date of the policy review. We compared this alternative allotment ratio 
to the simple AR ratio used in the paper which is based on all transactions and bids – irrespective of the 
date to maturity - over the same five-day trading period. The correlation between the two allotment 
ratios is extremely high, ranging from a low of 0.985 to 1 in five cases. No meaningful correlation 
exists for the sixth case as transactions and bids occurred only on two days prior to the policy review 
date. We interpret the high correlation between the two variants of the allotment ratio as evidence that 
the AR ratio reported in the paper is not distorted by the bidding behavior of trading banks in the lead-
up of an expected interest rate decrease.  
  15  The other question we address concerns the possible link between short-term 
interest rates in New Zealand on the one hand and short-term interest rates abroad, i.e. 
short-term interest rates in Australia and the United States. The financial market of 
New Zealand is fairly small and fully integrated with capital markets elsewhere. 
There are no restrictions on the flow of capital in and out of New Zealand. It is 
therefore natural to ask whether short-term interest rates in New Zealand respond to 
short-term interest rates in the region, i.e. in Australia or to short-term interest rates 
set in the world’s largest economy, the United States.   
  To assess the effects on the mean of the 90-day bank bill rate of the liquidity 
management operations undertaken by the Reserve Bank and to verify the existence 
of an interest rate link with foreign capital markets, we propose the following 
regression equation: 
n
NZ NZ NZ AUS NZ US
t 0 j t j 1 t1 t1 2 t1 t1 3 t 4 t
j1
5t 6 t 7 t 8 t 9 t t
r r (r r ) (r r ) ARI ARW
MSI MSW D1 D2 D3 v
αα β β β β
ββ β β β
−− − − −
=
Δ= + Δ+ − + − + +
++ + + + +
∑    
          ( 5 )  
where     It = 1 if reverse repo, 0 otherwise  tt ARI AR * I = t
t
t
    Wt = 1if repo or Treasury Bill transaction, 0 otherwise.  tt ARW AR *W =
  tt MSI MS * I =  
  tt t MSW MS *W =     
     
The change in the NZ 90-day bank bill rate is regressed on its own lags, the lag of the 
difference between the NZ 90-day bank bill rate and the Australian 90-day bank bill 
rate, the lag of the difference between the NZ 90-day bank bill rate and the US 90-day 
commercial paper rate, the allotment and the maturity spectrum ratio, respectively, 
where a distinction is made between liquidity-adding and liquidity-draining 
transactions, and three dummy variables. D1 captures the effect of monetary policy 
tightenings while D2 captures the effects of monetary policy easings. D3 is meant to 
capture the effect of special events such as “9/11”. Special events are interpreted as 
days on which the 90-day-bank bill rate changed by more than 15 basis points.
21 We 
                                                 
21 D3=1 on October 1
st, 1999, December 13
th, 1999, September 12
th, 2001, and December 4
th, 2003, 
and zero otherwise. Three of the above dates are associated with easily identifiable events. On October 
1
st, 1999, NZ Treasury finalized its economic outlook for the years ahead. The terrorist attack in the 
United States occurred on September 12
th, 2001 NZ time. On December 4
th, 2003 the Reserve Bank 
  16also estimate the following parsimonious specification for the time-varying variance 




t0 1 t 1 2 t 1 3 t4 t5 t6 t 7 t8 t9 h c c v c h c ARI c ARW c MSI c MSW c D1 c D2 c D3 −− =+ + + + + + + + + t
                                                                                                                                           
          (6) 
  The empirical estimates of the relevant coefficients appear in the top two 
panels of Table 3. Our preferred empirical specification for the conditional mean 
equation contains only the fifth lag of the dependent variable as a right-hand side 
variable. All other lagged dependent variables have coefficients that are statistically 
insignificant. The bottom panel of both tables also provides some feedback on the 
goodness of fit and the standard error of the regression for equation (5). 
  According to the findings of Table 3, there is substantial evidence for the 
claim that the 90-day bank bill rate in New Zealand is far more responsive to its 
Australian counterpart than to its American counterpart. In case the 90-day rate in 
New Zealand exceeds the 90-day rate in Australia, there is a tendency for the New 
Zealand rate on the following day to revert to the level set by the Australian rate. If 
the NZ 90-day bank bill rate exceeds the Australian rate by one percentage point, then 
the New Zealand rate is expected to decrease by approximately 0.3 basis points per 
day towards the Australian rate.
23 Thus the adjustment speed is rather slow but it is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. No such adjustment mechanism shows 
up in the results for the lag of the difference between the NZ 90-day and US 90-day 
interest rates.
24  The second noteworthy finding relates to the positive effect of the 
maturity spectrum ratio on the change in the NZ 90-day bank bill rate.
25 The greater 
the proportion of one-day reverse repo transactions relative to all transactions 
conducted by the Reserve Bank, the greater the impact on the 90-day bank bill rate. It 
 
announced that it would not change the official cash rate. Apparently financial market participants had 
expected an increase in the official cash rate as the 90-day bank bill rate decreased markedly on the day 
of the announcement. 
22 Assessing the impact of the lagged interest rate differentials on the variance turned out to be 
problematic due to the negative association between the lagged NZ and US interest rate differential and 
the time-varying variance. The negative association poses a problem as the variance is by definition a 
positive number.  
23 We also estimated the effect of the lagged difference between the NZ and US 90-day rate on the 
Australian 90-day bill rate. The error correction coefficient was statistically insignificant. Thus, there is 
feedback from Australian to New Zealand interest rates but not the other way around. 
24 The correlation between the lags of the two interest rate differentials is 0.47. 
25 The open-market operations carried out by the Reserve Bank precede the determination of the 90-day 
bank bill rate. As a result, there is no problem of endogeneity between the dependent variable and ARxt 
or MSxt  where x=I or W.  
  17thus seems that the behaviour of the 90-day bank bill rate depends to some extent on 
the way the Reserve Bank structures its open-market operations. The more the 
Reserve Bank engages in overnight reverse repo transactions the more it moves the 
90-day bank bill rate. This is consistent with the scenario that the Reserve Bank’s 
injection of additional cash into the financial sector and then its subsequent 
withdrawal on the following day left the financial participants with little room to 
manoeuvre. The shorter the average maturity of reverse repos, the larger the average 
shortage of cash available to trading banks.
26,27 This effect filtered through to the 
wider financial market, resulting in upward pressure on the 90-day bank bill rate. In 
contrast, the allotment ratio does not seem to exert any effect on the mean of the 90-
day bank bill rate. This implies that the extent to which the Reserve Bank 
accommodates the bids for ordinary or reverse repo transactions by the financial 
sector has no repercussions for the behaviour of the mean of the 90-day bank bill rate. 
Notice that the coefficients on the two dummy variables, which indicate changes in 
monetary policy, bear the expected sign and are both highly significant. In contrast, 
the coefficient of the third dummy variable which ought to capture idiosyncratic 
effects on the 90-day bank bill rate is statistically insignificant.
28 
  The estimates of the coefficients for the variance equation appear in the 
second panel from the top. We observe that neither the allotment ratio nor the 
maturity spectrum ratio had any discernible effect on the time-varying variance.
29  
Notice that in the GARCH (1,1) specification the coefficient on the dummy variable 
associated with a monetary policy tightening exercises a positive effect on the 
dependent variable.  The coefficients on the other two dummy variables are 
                                                 
26 William  A. Allen (2004), p. 27 expresses a similar view. 
27 There is no statistical evidence that the Reserve Bank’s willingness to supplement their standard 
open-market operations with additional overnight reverse repos in the week prior to the six-weekly 
review of the official cash rate (OCR) had any bearing on the 90-day bank bill rate. Adding to equation 
(5) a dummy variable that multiplies all overnight reverse repo transactions during the week preceding 
the OCR review results in a coefficient on DUM*MSI that is statistically insignificant. DUM=1 on the 
five trading days prior to each OCR review, DUM=0 otherwise. 
28 We also experimented with adding leads of changes in the 90-day bank bill rate to the specification. 
The leads are proxies for the forward-looking expectations of changes in the 90-day bank bill rate. 
However, adding the leads to the specification creates an endogeneity problem. The results reported in 
Table 3 concerning the allotment and maturity spectrum ratios are robust to this change in the 
specification of the regression equation. 
29 We initially distinguished between reverse and ordinary repo transactions in the construction of the 
allotment and maturity spectrum ratios. As neither injections nor withdrawals of liquidity had a 
systematic effect on the variance, we report only the coefficient estimates for the simple AR and MS 
ratios. 
 
  18statistically insignificant. Taken altogether, there is no evidence that the structure of 
open-market operations affected the variability of the 90-day bank bill rate in New 
Zealand over the sample period. Announced increases in the official cash rate were 
the only factor that added to the variability of the most important short-term interest 
rate in New Zealand. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
  
  This paper discusses the implementation of monetary policy in New Zealand 
over the period from 1999 to 2005 from an empirical perspective. The then operating 
procedure of the Reserve Bank was based on a symmetric channel where the deposit 
rate offered and lending rate charged by the Reserve Bank served as the lower and 
upper bound, respectively. The announced official cash rate was the midpoint of the 
channel and served as the benchmark for market-determined interest rates. Over the 
sample period, open-market operations served as the primary vehicle with the help of 
which the Reserve Bank of New Zealand controlled the volume of liquidity that the 
Bank thought was consistent with the announced target for the official cash rate. 
  Against this background, we examine whether the way in which the Reserve 
Bank structured its open-market operations influenced the behaviour of the key short-
term interest rate in New Zealand, the 90-day bank bill rate. We create two variables 
that capture important characteristics of the structure of open-market operations 
carried out by the Reserve Bank. They are the allotment ratio and the maturity 
spectrum ratio. The former measures the extent to which the Reserve Bank 
accommodates the bids submitted by trading banks in the daily auctions. The latter 
variable reflects primarily the importance of the provision of overnight liquidity in the 
transactions entered into by the Reserve Bank with the registered participants.  
  Our empirical findings suggest that the higher the share of overnight reverse 
repos in the total volume of transactions, the greater the effect on the 90-day bank bill 
rate. While the maturity structure ratio thus had a discernible effect on the 90-day 
bank bill rate no such effect was exerted through the allotment ratio. Assessing the 
impact of the maturity spectrum ratio and the allotment ratio on the volatility of the 
90-day bank bill rate, we find that neither variable contributed materially to the 
variability of this market-determined interest rate. 
  19  Given its small size, the financial market of New Zealand is subject to the 
influence of external factors such as conditions in financial markets abroad. The most 
natural foreign candidates that might influence the 90-day rate in New Zealand are its 
counterparts in Australia and the United States. Indeed, over the sample period the 
Zealand 90-day bank bill rate had a tendency to revert to the level set by its Australian 
counterpart, though at a relatively slow speed. No such link existed between the NZ 
90-day bank bill rate and the US 90-day commercial paper rate. This result is largely 
due to the fact that monetary policy changes in New Zealand and the United States 
went in opposite directions for a substantial length of time over the March 1999-June 
2005 period.  
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  NZOCR = Official Cash Rate in New Zealand 
  AUSOCR = Overnight Cash Rate in Australia 
 USFFR=  Federal  Funds  Rate in the United States 
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Figure 2 
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Table  1              
An Overview of Monetary Policy Settings and Changes         
New Zealand                      
Date of change Target value 
Target 













17/03/1999 4.50 na Wednesday 175 245      
17/11/1999 5.00  0.5 Wednesday 45 63 -0.01  - 
19/01/2000 5.25  0.25 Wednesday 19 27 0.05  + 
15/02/2000 5.75  0.5 Tuesday 46 64 0.02  + 
19/04/2000 6.00  0.25 Wednesday 20 28 0.05  + 
17/05/2000 6.50  0.5 Wednesday 215 301 0.05 + 
14/03/2001 6.25  -0.25 Wednesday 26 36 -0.11  + 
19/04/2001 6.00  -0.25 Thursday 19 27 -0.23  + 
16/05/2001 5.75  -0.25 Wednesday 90 126 -0.08  + 
19/09/2001  5.25  -0.5 Wednesday 40 56 -0.27  + 
14/11/2001 4.75  -0.5 Wednesday 90 126 -0.04  + 
20/03/2002 5.00  0.25 Wednesday 20 28 0.14  + 
17/04/2002 5.25  0.25 Wednesday 20 28 -0.03  - 
15/05/2002 5.50  0.25 Wednesday 35 49 -0.04  - 
3/07/2002 5.75  0.25 Wednesday 211 295 -0.03 - 
24/04/2003 5.50  -0.25 Thursday 30 42 -0.24  + 
5/06/2003 5.25  -0.25 Thursday 35 49 0.05  - 
24/07/2003 5.00  -0.25 Thursday 135 189 -0.01  + 
29/01/2004 5.25  0.25 Thursday 65 91 0.22 + 
29/04/2004 5.50  0.25 Thursday 30 42 0.12 + 
10/06/2004 5.75  0.25 Thursday 35 49 0.05 + 
29/07/2004 6.00  0.25 Thursday 30 42 0.04 + 
9/09/2004 6.25  0.25 Thursday 35 49 0.05 + 
28/10/2004 6.50  0.25 Thursday 95 133 -0.03 - 
10/03/2005 6.75  0.25 Thursday   0.12  + 
         Average 65.04 91.04     
Australia                      
02/Dec/1998 4.75  -0.25  Wednesday 240 336       
03/Nov/1999 5  0.25  Wednesday 65 91 -0.04  - 
02/Feb/2000 5.5  0.5  Wednesday 45 63 0.09  + 
05/Apr/2000 5.75  0.25  Wednesday 20 28 -0.01  - 
03/May/2000 6  0.25  Wednesday 65 91 0.03  + 
02/Aug/2000 6.25  0.25  Wednesday 135 189  0.09  + 
07/Feb/2001  5.75  -0.5  Wednesday 20  28  -0.31  + 
07/Mar/2001 5.5  -0.25  Wednesday 20 28 0.00  + 
04/Apr/2001 5  -0.5  Wednesday 110 154 -0.12  + 
05/Sep/2001 4.75  -0.25  Wednesday 20 28 0.02  - 
03/Oct/2001 4.5  -0.25  Wednesday 45 63 0.13  - 
05/Dec/2001 4.25  -0.25  Wednesday 110 154  0.09  - 
08/May/2002 4.5  0.25  Wednesday 20 28 0.07  + 
05/Jun/2002 4.75  0.25  Wednesday 370 518 -0.04  - 
05/Nov/2003 5  0.25  Wednesday 20 28 0.16  + 
03/Dec/2003 5.25  0.25  Wednesday 325 455 -0.01  - 
02/Mar/2005 5.5  0.25  Wednesday    0.00  + 
         Average 101.88 142.63     
  28Table 1 Continued 
 






















17/Nov/1998 4.75  0.25 Tuesday 161 225       
30/Jun/1999 5  0.25 Wednesday 39 55  -0.17 - 
24/Aug/1999 5.25  0.25 Tuesday 60 84  0.01  + 
16/Nov/1999 5.5  0.25 Tuesday 56 78  0.01 + 
02/Feb/2000 5.75  0.25 Wednesday 34 48  0.03  + 
21/Mar/2000 6  0.25 Tuesday 40 56  0.02  + 
16/May/2000 6.5  0.5 Tuesday 166 232  0.02 + 
03/Jan/2001 6  -0.5 Wednesday 20 28  0.05 - 
31/Jan/2001 5.5  -0.5 Wednesday 34 48  -0.12 + 
20/Mar/2001 5  -0.5 Tuesday 21 29  0.06 - 
18/Apr/2001 4.5  -0.5 Wednesday 19 27  0.01  - 
15/May/2001 4  -0.5 Tuesday 31 43  -0.10  + 
27/Jun/2001 3.75  -0.25 Wednesday 39 55  0.03  - 
21/Aug/2001 3.5  -0.25 Tuesday 19 27  -0.03 + 
17/Sep/2001 3  -0.5 Monday 11 15  0.00 - 
02/Oct/2001 2.5  -0.5 Tuesday 25 35  -0.06 + 
06/Nov/2001 2  -0.5 Tuesday 25 35  -0.12  + 
11/Dec/2001 1.75  -0.25 Tuesday 236 330  -0.06  + 
06/Nov/2002  1.25  -0.5 Wednesday 165 231  -0.21  + 
25/Jun/2003 1  -0.25 Wednesday 265 371  0.10 - 
30/Jun/2004 1.25  0.25 Wednesday 29 41  0.00  + 
10/Aug/2004 1.5  0.25 Tuesday 30 42  0.03 + 
21/Sep/2004 1.75  0.25 Tuesday 36 50  0.00  + 
10/Nov/2004 2  0.25 Wednesday 24 34  0.00  + 
14/Dec/2004 2.25  0.25 Tuesday 36 50  0.01  + 
02/Feb/2005 2.5  0.25 Wednesday 34 48  0.02 + 
22/Mar/2005 2.75  0.25 Tuesday 30 42  0.00  + 
03/May/2005 3  0.25 Tuesday 42 58  0.01  + 
30/Jun/2005 3.25  0.25 Thursday    0.02  + 
         Average 61.68 86.32       
            
Note: The sample period extends from 17 March 1999, the day the Reserve Bank of New Zealand  
changed its operating procedure, to 30 June 2005. The first (last) data entry for Australia and the US 
corresponds to the first (last) change in the target rate after (before) 17 March 1999 (30 June 2005).
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Table 2  
Changes in the Policy Instrument and the Impact Effect on the Market 
Interest Rate: 17 March 1999 – 30 June 2005 
 
  New Zealand  Australia  United States 
Total number of changes in 
the policy instrument 
           24        16         28 
25  basis points decreases               6          4           4 
25  basis points increases             13          9         14 
50 basis points decreases               2          2            9 
50 basis points increases               3          1           1 
Range of Policy Instrument         4.5-6.75      4.5-6.25       1-6.5 
Target Rate at Beginning             4.5       4.75        4.75 
Target Rate at End             6.75        5.5        3.25 
Average Duration of Policy 
Stance in Trading Days 
        65.04        101.88       61.68 
Average Duration of Policy 
Stance in Calendar Days 
        91.04        142.63       86.32 
  30Table 3 
How the Conditional Mean and Variance Respond to Interest Rate Spreads and the 
Structure of Open Market Operations 
 
Mean Equation    
                          Coefficient   Std. Error
c  0.0012 0.0012
t5 r− Δ   0.0762
** 0.0279
AUS
t1 t1 rr −− −   -0.0029
* 0.0013
US
t1 t1 rr −− −   0.0002 0.0003
ARIt  0.0011 0.0021
ARWt  -0.0030 0.0046
MSIt  0.0057
** 0.0017





D3  -0.0217 0.0646




t1 v −   0.1041
** 0.0268
t1 h −   0.8115
** 0.01316
ARt  0.00002 0.00005
MSt  0.000003 0.00001
D1  0.0013
** 0.0005
D2  0.0018 0.0013
D3  0.0066 0.0042
Adj. R
2  0.112
S.E of regression  0.027
F-statistic  11.98
No of obs.  1567
 
The standard errors were computed along the lines suggested by Bollerslev 
and Wooldridge (1992). Their procedure yields a heteroskedasticity consistent 
covariance matrix. 
** denotes statistical significance at 1 percent level 
* denotes statistical significance at 5 percent level. 
  
Specification of Mean Equation: 
 
n
NZ NZ NZ AUS NZ US
t 0 j t j 1 t1 t1 2 t1 t1 3 t 4 t
j1
5t 6 t 7 t 8 t 9 t t
r r (r r ) (r r ) ARI ARW
MSI MSW D1 D2 D3 v
αα β β β β
ββ β β β
−− − − −
=
Δ= + Δ+ − + − + +
++ + + + +
∑
 
where      tt ARI AR * I = t t tt MSI MS * I = (I=1 for Reverse Repo, 0 otherwise) 
    tt ARW AR *W = t t tt MSW MS *W =  (W=1 for Repo, 0 otherwise) 
Specification of Variance Equation: 
2
t0 1 t 1 2 t 1 3 t4 t5 6 7 tt h c cv ch cA R cM S cD 1 cD 2 cD 3 −− =+ + + + + + + t  
 
  31